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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITo's Norm.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.*)

AND ERROR-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-No. 12373Employers Fire Insurance Company vs. Bartee-Decided
February 24, 1930.
Facts.-The company insured Bartee against loss from
theft of his automobile. Bartee filed a complaint alleging
that his car was stolen and wrecked, and in due course had a
verdict against the Company. After the case was lodged in
this court Bartee moved to strike the bill of exceptions, which
was done. Pending this motion the Company filed its brief
on application for a supersedeas and asked for a decision
on the merits.
Held.-The only question worth considering, that is
whether "theft" includes borrowing with intent to return, is
excluded through the striking of the bill of exceptions.
Judgmen't Affirmed.
APPEAL

ATTORNEYS-

DISBARMENT-

INDEFINITE SUSPENSION-NO.

125 15-People v. Kelley-Decided Feb. 10, 1930.
Facts.-This was an original proceeding in the Supreme
Court against one Kelley for abuse of his privileges and a
violation of his trust as an attorney and officer of this Court.
A dispute arose between one McCune and one Hower concerning the possession of certain personal property. A legal remedy existed for the settlement of that question. Kelley, representing McCune, attempted to intimidate Hower and twice
threatened him with criminal prosecution. These tactics
failing, he obtained police assurance that he might resort
EEDITOR'S COMMENT: This issue marks a departure in the conduct of this department of Dicta. Hitherto abstracts of decisions have not been printed until the lapse
of the time within which a petition for rehearing might be filed or until such petition,
if filed, had been disposed of. In future, such abstracts will be published in the issue
next appearing after rendition of the decision. Thus the abstracts are not in a strict
sense final. Any withdrawal or modification of any opinion resulting from a petition
for rehearing will, however, be duly noted in subsequent digests.
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to force without interference. Thereupon he broke down the
door, took possession, and held possession of an office room
over night. Kelley's threats rendered him liable to a fine of
$500 and six months' imprisonment.
Held.-The judgment of the Court is that respondent be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of his profession.
Mr. Chief Justice Whitford and Mr. Justice Butler concurred
in part and dissented in part.
ATTRNEYS-DISBARMENT-SUSPENSION-NO.

12519-Peo-

ple v. Ginsberg-DecidedFeb. 17, 1930.
Facts.-Original proceedings brought in the Supreme
Court on relation of The Colorado Bar Association against
Ginsberg to disbar him from practicing as an attorney or
otherwise discipline him. The original petition contained
four charges.
Held.-1. For a lawyer to advertise for claims against
others, whether they are in financial difficulties or not, tends
to bring reproach on the legal profession. Such conduct is
grossly unethical.
2. A lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
3. The position of an attorney as attorney for the Receiver of a defunct concern and as a private speculator in
its securities is wholly inconsistent.
4. Attention is called to the seventeenth canon of ethics.
Judgment of Suspension for One Year.
CONTRACTS-

REPURCHASE

AGREEMENT-

CHATTEL

MORT-

GAGE-AGENCY-No. 12277-InternationalTrust Company

v. Stearns Investment Company, et al.-Decided January
27,1930.
Facts.-The Court below sustained a general demurrer
to the complaint, and the plaintiff elected to stand on the complaint. The Water Company, the Investment Company, and
the Securities Company were allied and interrelated corporations with interlocking offices and directors.
The Investment Company sold to the International Trust
Company a promissory note executed by the Land Company
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to secure a Deed of Trust, and the Investment Company
agreed "upon request to re-purchase this loan * * * at any
time on sixty days' notice at par and accrued interest." When
demand was made for a repurchase, the Investment Company
was hopelessly insolvent and was unable to re-purchase.
Held.-The Investment Company was under no contractual obligation to repurchase the note, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that had demand been made before
it became insolvent, it would not have repurchased it. Faced
with the possibility of again becoming the owner of the note,
its action in protecting its interest by purchasing the property
at tax sale, thus preventing its purchase by a stranger was the
exercise of ordinary business prudence. No contractual right
of the Trust Company was violated by the transaction. Under
the agreement the Trust Company had the right to return the
note and receive the amount of the principal of the note, with
interest thereon; that, and nothing more. It received that
amount when at the foreclosure sale it bought the property
for the full amount of the principal indebtedness, interest,
costs, and expenses of sale. The demurrer was properly sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACTS -ACCEPTANCE

-

COUNTERCLAIM -AMENDMENT

No. 12344-Rugby Coal Company v. Interstate Fuel Company-Decided February17, 1930.
Facts.-The Interstate Fuel Company had judgment below against the Rugby Coal Company for balance due for
coal delivered. The Coal Company admitted the delivery of
the coal and the balance due, but sought by counterclaim to
recover damages occasioned by loss of profits arising out of
a breach of an alleged contract between the parties by reason
of certain letters. The offer of sale was made by letter, and in
the alleged acceptance letter, the acceptance was made, but
with certain modifications.
Held.-1. The modification of the Fuel Company's offer was substantial and material and effectually operates as
a refusal to accept the Fuel Company's offer, and constitutes
a counter offer to the Fuel Company, which the record dis-
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closes was, in fact, never accepted. The minds of the parties
never met upon the exact terms and conditions of the contemplated agreement set forth in the counterclaim, and therefore
no enforceable contract was consummated.
2. The first application for leave to amend the counterclaim appears in the brief of the Coal Company in support of
its motion for a new trial. Such request came too late, and it
was not error for the Court to deny such request.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY-

EVIDENCE -

No.

12334-Bunch v. People-DecidedJanuary 20, 1930.
Facts.-Bunch was sentenced for a term of fifteen to
eighteen years on a verdict of aggravated robbery. The only
assignments argued are: 1-The insufficiency of the evidence; 2-The giving of instruction No. 4.
Held.-Evidence sufficient. Corpus delicti may be made
by circumstantial evidence. Rule requiring corroboration of
a confession is met if the additional evidence is sufficient to
convince the jury that the crime charged is real and not imaginary. Instructions not erroneous.
Judgment Affirmed.
12426-King v.
People-DecidedJan. 20, 1930.
Facts.-FariceKing was found guilty of murder in the
first degree. Her defense was "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Held.-First: The evidence did not raise a reasonable
doubt as to defendant's sanity, and the determination on this
point by the jury was final.
Second: The Court did not err in refusing inspection
of letters.
Third: Photograph of deceased taken immediately after
shooting was properly admitted.
Fourth: Lower Court's treatment of attorney for defendant not prejudicial.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSANITY-NO.

DICTA
CRIMINAL

LAW-MURDER-SUFFICIENCY

OF

EVIDENCE-

LEADING QUESTIONS-NO. 12418-Weiss v. People-De-

cided February3,1930.
Facts.-Weiss was convicted of murder in the first degree
for killing his wife and sentenced to be hanged. At the time
of the homicide Weiss was seen running at full speed in pursuit of his fleeing wife out on the street with a gun in his hand
and when within eight feet of her, he shot her in the back of
the neck severing the spinal cord from which she died.
Held.-l. On a charge of murder, a trial by jury is imperative. In the instant case, the jury has passed upon the
credibility of the witnesses and determined the weight of the
evidence, and having found the facts against the defendant
and the evidence as a whole being sufficient, the verdict of
the jury cannot be disturbed.
2. Where the State is taken by surprise in one of its witnesses, it is proper under such circumstances for the State to
be permitted to cross examine this witness.
3. Improper questions asked of the defendant by the
State on cross-examination where the objection to the question
is sustained and the Court later instructs the jury not to consider evidence rejected by the Court is not sufficient to constitute reversible error.
Judgment Affirmed.
12464-Massachusetts Protective
Association, Inc. v. Daugherty-DecidedJanuary 13, 1930.
Facts.-Daughertyrecovered judgment on an insurance

INSURANCE-SUICIDE-NO.

policy which contained a clause insuring against any loss resulting from bodily injuries effected by accidental means, but

excluding self-destruction while sane or insane. The insured
committed suicide after the policy had been in force more
than a year. No notice was served upon the insurance company of the claim until about two years after the death.
Held.-I. Where a person commits suicide while insane,
the death is an accident.
2. Under the Statutes of Colorado, the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year is not a defense against
the payment of the life insurance policy.

DICTA

3. Where the policy provided for immediate notice of
the claim of the company, yet under the circumstances of this
case where the policy itself expressly said the company would
not be liable in the event that the insured committed suicide,
this was sufficient excuse for a delay in making the claim; and
further, the very fact that the company put this in this policy
was, in effect, a denial of the claim in advance and inured to
the benefit of the beneficiary.
Judgment Affirmed.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-

DAMAGES-

DEFECTIVE MAN-

12303Peek v. City of Lamar-DecidedFeb. 17, 1930.
Facts.-Action by Peek for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained through negligence of the City in permitting a manhole of a storm sewer in one of its streets to remain for a long time in a defective and dangerous condition.
General demurrer was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiff
elected to stand on the amended complaint and the ruling of
the trial court sustaining the demurrer. No written notice
was served by the plaintiff upon the City in regard to his alleged injuries within 90 days, as provided in Section 9157,
Compiled Laws of 1921.
Held.-In an action against a municipal corporation, to
recover damages for an injury resulting from defective streets,
the complaint must show that the written notice required by
statute has been given, or it fails to state a cause of action.
Judgment Affirmed.
HOLE-FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE OF CLAIM-No.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-

FRANCHISE-ELECTIONS--No.

12452-Inland Utilities Company, et al. v. Schell, et al.Decided January 6, 1930.
Facts.-The town of Burlington, Colorado, an incorporated municipal corporation, was the owner of its electric light
plant and also its water plant, which were used in connection with each other. It attempted to pass an ordinance selling its electric light plant to private parties and to grant a
twenty-five year franchise without the parties applying for
the franchise, advertising that an application would be made
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to the town council for a franchise as provided in sections
9172 and 9173 by the Compiled Laws of 1921 and later an
election was held in attempting to ratify the sale of the electric
light plant.
Held.-The pleadings affirmatively showing that no publication was made of the application for a franchise to operate
an electric light plant as provided for in section 9173 of the
Compiled Laws of 1921 the lower Court was right granting
an injunction enjoining the sale of the electric light plant and
the granting of the franchise.
Judgment Affirmed.
PAYMENT-APPROPRIATION-JUDGMENT-SUBPOENA

DUCES

TECUM-No. 12053-Armour & Company et al v. McPhee
& McGinnity Company-Decided February17, 1930.
Facts.-While case was pending in Supreme Court, trial
court requested that claim of one, Vosmer, whose lien had been
established, be remitted to the trial court for further investigation because of a showing that had been made indicating
misconduct on the part of Vosmer, which caused improper
judgment in his favor. Hearing was had on Vosmer's claim,
court found that he had testified falsely and that he had failed
to produce records required by subpoena duces tecum, and
adjudged him guilty of contempt and ordered him confined in
the County jail for a period of thirty days.
Held.-1. Vosmer failed to comply with the subpoena
duces tecum.
2. The Court did not err in vacating the judgment which
had been rendered in favor of Vosmer at the time of the first
trial and in entering judgment in favor of Armour and Company, dismissing Vosmer's claim of lien.
3. While a creditor is not obliged to make an application immediately the payment is made, still where he does
apply the payment in a particular way, he is bound by his
act and cannot afterwards change the application without the
consent of the debtor.
4. While a creditor has the right to apply a general
payment made, to any account which it may have against the
debtor, when no application is made by the debtor himself, yet

DICTA

this must be done at the time and before any controversy
arises. It is too late to make application of payments while
preparing for suit or after the suit is instituted.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE-MISTRIAL-WITHDRAWAL

OF

COMPLAINT-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-NO. 11973-Reagan v. Dyrenforth, et al.-Decided February 24, 1930.
Facts.-This writ of error is to review a judgment of the
Denver district court for $15,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs
below (defendants here) for malicious prosecution. The defendant below and plaintiffs below are owners respectively
of adjoining mining claims, and have been engaged in litigation for many years in various courts. Plaintiffs began an
action against defendant in this case in the district court of
Gunnison County for damages for malicious prosecution. On
October 5, 1925, a jury was sworn, and thereupon, defendant
moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court refused to
enter this judgment, but granted plaintiff's request that a juror
be withdrawn, a mistrial directed, and that he be given 30
days in which to file a new complaint so that the case might
be ready for trial at the April term of the court. The new
complaint was not filed in 30 days, but a new action (the
present one) was commenced over eight months later in the
Denver district court. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
this action, which the trial court overruled.
Held.-The action should have been dismissed. The trial
in the district court of Gunnison County having commenced,
the plaintiffs did not have an absolute right to withdraw their
complaint, but only as and on such terms as the trial court,
in its sound discretion might order. The court, in effect, imposed the terms that plaintiffs should file a new complaint in
the same court within 30 days. These conditions were not
complied with, and plaintiffs could not seek another forum for
their action.
Butler J. dissents.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.

DICTA

12255-Cadwell
v. Dunfee, et al.-DecidedFebruary 24, 1930.
Facts.-Cadwellsued Dunfee and Mink for damages for
their interference with his alleged "way of necessity" through
their land. At the trial, plaintiff waived the claim of statutory "way of necessity", and consented that the case be tried
on the existence of an alleged independent agreement. The
trial court found no agreement.
Held.-The claim under the statute was waived at the
trial and cannot be pressed here. There was no conflicting
evidence about the alleged agreement, and the finding of the
trial court must stand.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-WAIVER-NO.

STENOGRAPHIC POSITION WANTED
Expert stenographer with ten years' experience
position in law office.
Call MARGARET FALLON
960 Pearl St., Apt. B, YOrk 5216

desires

FOR SALE
Pacific States Reports. 135 vols., in 40 books, extra annotated with Ross Digest 3 vols. All bound in buckram and in
fine condition.
Address, A. D. BULLIS, Fort Morgan, Colorado.

